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Poor decisions and conflicts of interest by members of company boards of directors have 
been a factor in the dramatic rise in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, 
resulting in a lower return on equity (ROE) for shareholders. The purpose of this 
correlational study was to examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO 
duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, as measured 
by total assets. Agency theory was the theoretical framework for this study. The study 
examined whether a statistically significant relationship existed between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
firm size. Archival data were collected and analyzed from a sample of publicly traded 
firms in the United States listed on the 2016 Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. Hierarchical 
multiple regression techniques were used to test the relationship between variables. The 
results indicated that there was not a statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
firm size. The study may contribute to positive social change by increasing the potential 
for board of directors’ members to implement best practices, contributing to reduced 
shareholder conflicts, less litigation, higher ROE, and enhanced investor confidence 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Business leaders, regulators, and scholars have sought the optimal level of chief 
executive officer (CEO) compensation and board structure since the turn of the 20th 
century (Moore, 2015). Researchers who have focused on CEO compensation and board 
structure, have generated mixed results regarding the relationship between the variables 
(Pan, Huang, & Gopal, 2018). CEO compensation and board structure remain a concern 
for organizational leaders as these leaders endeavor to optimize financial performance for 
their shareholders (Jaggia & Thosar, 2017).   
Background of the Problem 
Business leaders face significant pressure from shareholders to deliver increasing 
corporate profit (Irani & Oesch, 2016). Shareholders of a company elect a board of 
directors to govern the organization and safeguard shareholder interests to meet 
shareholder objectives (Majumdar, 2017). Corporate scandals in the late 1990s and early 
2000s increased the focus of business leaders, scholars, and regulators to the behavior 
and structure of boards of directors.  
In response to corporate scandals and increased investor and business leader 
concerns, the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) became law in 2010. Provisions of the DFA 
required business leaders to examine their practices regarding CEO compensation, board 
of directors’ composition, and the issue of CEO duality, where the CEO also serves as the 
chairman of the board (Paulo & Le Roux, 2016). The focus of this study was if the 
amount of CEO compensation and the practice of CEO duality meets the shareholder 




Poor decisions and conflicts of interest by members of company boards of 
directors have been a factor in the dramatic rise in CEO compensation, resulting in a 
lower ROE for investors (Hill, Lopez, & Reitenga, 2016). From 1992 to 2010, the board 
of director members of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Index companies increased CEO 
compensation 281%, without a corresponding increase in ROE (Shue & Townsend, 
2017). The general business problem is that company investors have received lower 
returns as CEO compensation, and instances of board of directors’ member’s conflict of 
interest including CEO duality have increased. The specific business problem is that 
some boards of directors members do not understand the relationship between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
firm size. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The independent variables were CEO compensation 
and CEO duality. The dependent variable was ROE. The control variables were CEO age, 
CEO tenure, and firm size. The target population was companies listed on the S&P 500 
index. The implications for positive social change included the potential for the board of 
directors’ members to implement best practices contributing to reduced shareholder 
conflicts, less litigation, higher ROE, enhanced investor confidence benefiting emerging 
economies, and local communities.  
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Nature of the Study 
I chose the quantitative method for this study. The three methods for conducting 
research are (a) quantitative, (b) qualitative, and (c) mixed methods (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2016). Researchers use the quantitative method to examine numerical data objectively 
and conduct statistical analyses to test hypotheses (Quick & Hall, 2015). Researchers use 
the qualitative method to explore characteristics or complexities of a particular 
phenomenon that they cannot reduce to a numerical value (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). 
Researchers use mixed methods research when elements of quantitative and qualitative 
research are desired to address the research questions (Ingham-Broomfield, 2016). The 
quantitative method was the appropriate method for this study because the goal of this 
study was to objectively examine numerical data, test hypotheses, and examine the 
relationship between variables of CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE. I included 
controls for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size.  
A correlational design was most appropriate for this study. The three major 
designs in quantitative research are (a) correlational, (b) experimental, and (c) quasi-
experimental (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Researchers select a correlational design to 
explore the extent of a relationship between two or more variables (Prion & Haerling, 
2014). The experimental design was suitable for assessing cause-and-effect relationships 
and includes control and experimental groups (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). This study did 
not include control and experimental groups, and thus an experimental design was not 
appropriate for this study. Researchers who use a quasi-experimental design omit 
randomization from an experimental design (May, Luth, & Schwoerer, 2014). This study 
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used a random sample, and thus a quasi-experimental design was not appropriate for this 
study. I chose a correlational design because the basis of my topic of research was not an 
ambiguous problem, but rather the focus of the study was examining the extent of a 
relationship between the variables CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after 
controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size.  
Research Question  
This study included the following research question: Does a statistically 
significant relationship exist between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after 
controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size?  
Hypotheses  
H01: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation 
and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
H02: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Theoretical Framework 
Researchers identify a theoretical framework in a study to indicate where their 
research fits into previous research and identify theories that might support a study 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Agency theory served as the theoretical framework for this 
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study. Agency theory is the predominant theory in corporate governance and executive 
compensation literature (Boussaidi & Mounira, 2015; Palanissamy, 2015). Berle and 
Means introduced agency theory in 1932 to describe the conflict between a principal and 
an agent, and Jensen and Meckling were researchers that extended agency theory in 1976 
to corporate governance (Gao & Li, 2015). Gao and Li (2015) explained that researchers 
have developed agency theory to explain how to control the conflict that arises between a 
principal (owner or shareholder) who has hired an agent (manager or CEO) to perform 
tasks on the principal’s behalf. As applied to this study, total annual CEO compensation 
represented CEO compensation, and CEO duality existed when the CEO was also the 
chairman of the company’s board of directors.  
After controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, I applied agency theory 
to this study, as my focus was on finding whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE. Fama and Jensen 
(1983b) posited that CEOs’ actions will more likely support the needs of the shareholders 
when their compensation package aligns with firm performance. Amzaleg, Azar, Ben-
Zion and Rosenfeld (2014) argued that combining the roles of CEO and chairman of the 
board decreases the ability of the members of the board of directors to monitor the 
actions of the CEO and results in conflicts of interest. 
Operational Definitions 
CEO duality: A situation where the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board 
(Moore, 2015).   
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Incentive compensation: Total stock options, restricted stock awards, bonus 
payments, and long-term cash incentive payments (Song & Wan, 2017). 
Return on assets (ROA): An accounting ratio calculated as net income divided by 
total assets (Peni, 2014). 
Return on equity (ROE): A financial ratio calculated as net income divided by 
shareholder equity (Azeez, 2015). 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are conditions that have not been verified but are considered by a 
researcher to be a fact (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Three assumptions existed for this 
study. First, I assumed that financial performance as measured by ROE, CEO 
compensation, and board composition data collected from company documents filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contained accurate financial data for the 
firms’ 2016 fiscal year. Second, I assumed that a relationship exists between the variables 
to generate a testable relational hypotheses. Finally, I assumed that agency theory was an 
appropriate theoretical framework for studying CEO compensation, CEO duality, and 
ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size in publicly traded 
companies in the United States.  
Limitations 
Limitations are weaknesses that are out of control of the researcher (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2016). Three limitations existed for this study. First, the study included data 
from publicly traded companies in the United States from a broad spectrum of industries 
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to test the research hypotheses. Second, study findings may not generalizable to specific 
industries as S&P 500 data might be to representative of a larger population. Third, 2016 
as the selected fiscal year was a limitation, in that unique economic forces, such as an 
increase in federal funds interest rate, might have occurred during 2016. Fourth, the study 
included one measure of corporate performance. ROE was used to measure corporate 
performance, and other indicators such as ROA and Tobin’s Q could also have been 
appropriate. It is unlikely that one specific corporate performance measure can 
sufficiently capture performance. 
Delimitations 
Delimitations are choices made by the researcher which describe the boundaries 
that the researcher has set for the study (Newman, Hitchcock, & Newman, 2015). For this 
study, I chose a random sample of publicly traded companies listed on the S&P 500 
index. Measuring CEO duality involved assigning a value of 1 when the CEO also served 
as the chairman of the board, and 0 if that is not the case. For this study, I did not intend 
to study other aspects of corporate governance and only intended to study firm data for 
the 2016 fiscal year and no other years.  
The second independent variable for this study was CEO compensation, which 
included salary, bonuses, restricted stock awards, and option awards. Other members of 
the executive committee, such as the chief financial officer, chief operating officer, and 
chief technology officer were not a focus of the study. ROE, a measure of financial 
performance, was the dependent variable for this study. Other measures of financial 
performance, such as ROA, Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of a firm to the book 
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value, revenue, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, and profit 
margin were not within the scope of this study. Finally, to be eligible for participation, a 
company needed to (a) have been listed on the S&P 500 index each day in 2016, (b) have 
filed an annual report with the SEC for their 2016 fiscal year, (c) have filed a proxy 
statement with the SEC for their 2016 fiscal year, (d) have the same CEO for the entire 
2016 fiscal year, and (e) have the same chairman of the board for their entire 2016 fiscal 
year. 
Significance of the Study 
Business leaders, including board of directors members, consistently face the need 
to improve financial performance and maximize profits for shareholders (Irani & Oesch, 
2016). The results from this study may be of value to business leaders and boards of 
directors. A better understanding of the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO 
duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, could 
maximize value for company shareholders by decreasing shareholder conflict and 
lowering organizational costs. The results from this study may also contribute to the 
effective practice of businesses by helping business leaders predict CEO compensation 
levels and the optimal board of directors structure for a company to optimize profits.  
For community residents, the results of this study may contribute to positive 
social change by building confidence in capital markets. Confidence in capital markets 
contributes to economic growth (Chapman, Fang, Li, & Stone, 2017; Das & Das, 2016). 
Economic growth may lead to increased employment levels, foreign direct investment, 
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and increased economic opportunity for people living in developing parts of the world 
and their communities (Rafindadi & Yusof, 2015).  
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The predictor variables were CEO compensation 
and CEO duality.  The criterion variable was ROE.  Archival data for a sample of 
companies on the S&P 500 index in 2016 was used to examine the variables based on the 
following hypotheses: 
H01: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation 
and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
H02: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Organization of the Review 
The following review of relevant professional and academic literature consists 
primarily of articles published between 2014 and 2018. The majority of the articles were 
from peer reviewed journals. This review includes six principal sections (a) strategy for 
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searching the literature, (b) agency and other corporate governance theories, (c) CEO 
compensation (d) CEO duality, (e) financial performance, and (f) the DFA. 
Strategy for Searching the Literature 
This study contained 181 references, of which 167 have a publication date 
between 2014 and 2018. Peer-reviewed references comprised 93.6% of the total 
references (see Table 1). Frequently used search terms included agency theory, corporate 
governance theory, CEO compensation CEO duality, financial performance, and ROE. 
The following databases were the primary sources for this literature review ProQuest, 
Science Direct Journals, Emerald Management Journals, and EBSCO Discovery Service 
through the Walden University Library. My focus on academic journals included 135 
journals such as Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Financial Economic, Procedia – Social and 
Behavioral Sciences.  
Table 1 
 
Frequency and Percentage of Sources Used in the Study 
 
Note. Articles from peer-reviewed journals which were published in the past 5 years 
constituted 89.5% of the total sources. 
 
 References   
Resources ≤ 5 years old 6+ years old N % 
Peer-reviewed articles 162 11 173 93.6 
Other journal articles 2 2 4  
Books 2 1 3  
Dissertations 1  1  




 To understand the link between agency theory and professional practice, it is 
important to review the development of the corporation. During the middle of the 19th 
century, the concept of a company with property rights and legal liability separate from 
its owners came into being (Tricker, 2015). This new corporate form led to industrial 
growth worldwide, as companies were able to raise capital from many shareholders and 
became large and complex (Tricker, 2015). To facilitate management of the company, 
shareholders contracted with individuals to manage their interests, the concept of a 
principal and agent relationship extended to the management of corporations, and control 
of the organization shifted from the owners to management (Berle & Means, 1932). The 
recognition of this shift in power led to the development of agency theory.  
Berle and Means (1932) described the agency problem as the separation of control 
and resulting conflict between owners (principals) and managers (agents) that becomes 
more significant as the company grows and the agents gain more power. Berle and Means 
hypothesized that as agents gain more power, control shifts from the principal to the 
agent, and many of the checks and balances designed to limit the power of the agent 
disappear. The work of Berle and Means formed the basis for the development of agency 
theory, which is the dominant theory in corporate governance literature. 
 In the 1970s, following a period of significant worldwide industrial growth, 
scholars revived the work of Berle and Means and advanced agency theory. Drawing 
from the theories of agency, property rights, and finance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
developed a theory of the firm to explain how the conflicting objectives of the agent and 
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the principal can achieve equilibrium. Jensen and Meckling shifted the focus from how to 
design the contract between the agent and the principal to the activities that maximize the 
behavior of the agent and the principal to solve the agency problem at the lowest possible 
cost. Also in the 1970s, the term corporate governance achieved prominence in the 
United States following the collapse of the large railway-based conglomerate, Penn 
Central (Cheffins, 2015). Three executives at Penn Central were charged with fraud 
following billions of dollars of Penn Central investor losses. The collapse shifted the 
focus of shareholder to the board of directors, who are responsible for implementing 
governance mechanisms to control agent behavior (Fama & Jensen, 1983a).  
Fama (1980) contended a market for the agent’s services exists, and the value 
placed on those services depends on the extent to which a firm is successful. The effect 
on future wages gives an agent a stake in the outcome of a firm (Fama, 1980). Fama and 
Jensen (1983a) theorized that compensation, especially in the form of ownership rights, 
aligns the interest of the agent to the shareholders. 
Jensen (1983) clarified the two fundamental agency theory viewpoints as 
positivist and principal-agent. Positivist researchers seek to identify situations where the 
principal and agent’s goals conflict and determine the governance mechanism to solve the 
problem (Bendickson et al., 2016; Eisenhardt, 1989). Principal-agent researchers are 
concerned with the theory of the relationship between the agent and the principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The two view of positivist and principal-agent researchers are 
complementary in that they have the same assumptions regarding humans, organizations, 
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and information (Eisenhardt, 1989). The focus of this research was the agency dilemma 
or problems with governance mechanisms; hence, I used a positivist lens. 
Following corporate scandals in the 1990s and 2000s, shareholders worldwide 
demanded changes in governance policies (Lopatta & Kaspereit, 2014). Leaders in the 
United Kingdom passed the Combined Code on Corporate Governance to address the 
governance concerns of shareholders and reduce agency costs through monitoring. 
Akbar, Poletti-Hughes, El-Faitouri, and Shah (2016) studied compliance with 
recommended governance practices before and after the adoption of the Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance and found no evidence of improved financial performance. In 
the United States, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and the DFA 
increased the visibility of executive compensation (Paulo & Le Roux, 2016). SOX 
includes strict penalties for noncompliance, and the DFA requires that shareholders vote 
on executive compensation plans (Cebon & Hermalin, 2015; Zalewska, 2014).  
Agency theorists assume that human, organizational, and cost assumptions are 
inherent in agency theory. The human assumptions are self-interest, bounded rationality, 
and risk aversion (Eisenhardt, 1989). The organizational assumptions are goal conflict, 
efficiency, and information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency cost assumptions 
include costs to structure the contract with the agent, monitor the agent, restrict the 
agent’s contractual authority, and residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Agency theorists presume agents are self-interested (Eisenhardt, 1989). Berle and 
Means (1932) theorized that personal profit is the primary motivator for the agent and the 
profit-seeking agent cannot meet shareholder expectations of distributions and increases 
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in market value without checks and balances. Agents act in their own best interest before 
they act in the best interest of principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). Fama (1980) added 
that managers act in their own self-interest but understand that their success also depends 
on the success of their firm.  
An agent’s self-interest has boundaries, such as perceived fairness (Bosse & 
Phillips, 2016). Pepper, Gosling, and Gore (2015), for example, surveyed 756 senior 
executives and found that executives accept incentive contracts designed with perceived 
fairness in mind more readily than those that they perceive to be unfair. Bosse and 
Phillips (2016) theorized that agents will seek to maximize their self-interest but only to 
the extent that it does not violate the boundary of fairness. When agents perceive fairness 
with their incentive compensation, the shareholders benefit, and when agents perceive a 
lack of fairness, agency costs increase (Bosse & Phillips, 2016).  
Agency theorists assume agents are risk averse (Foss & Stea, 2014). Agents may 
avoid investing time and energy in activities that may increase their personal risk, even if 
they could result in a higher value of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). Some 
shareholders are risk neutral because they can diversify their financial portfolio, whereas 
agents are risk averse because they cannot diversify their compensation (Zona, 2016). 
Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2015) studied corporate tax avoidance as a 
risky behavior and found that managers will exhibit more of the risky behavior of tax 
avoidance when equity incentives are part of their compensation. Female CEOs, 
however, may exhibit less risk-taking behavior, as do less confident CEOs, which could 
indicate that risk-taking may be a multifaceted characteristic (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 
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2016). Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco (2016) studied the effect of female board of 
director members on firm performance and found that firm performance increases with a 
gender-balanced board of directors.  Foss and Stea (2014) also noted that agency theorists 
may fail to consider the psychological dimensions of interpersonal relationships. 
 Related to the human assumption of self-interest is the organizational assumption 
of goal conflict. A compensation structure that benefits the agent and principal can reduce 
goal conflict and the negative activities of self-serving CEOs (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
Chen and Jermias (2014), for example, studied the business strategies of companies listed 
on the S&P 500 index from 2000 to 2005 and found that aligning compensation to 
business strategy had a positive effect on firm performance. The alignment, however, 
may not apply to all firms in all circumstances (Chen & Jermias, 2014). Zona (2016) said 
that CEO tenure is a factor that needs to receive consideration when company leaders 
issue incentive compensation.  
Agency theorists contend that information asymmetry results when an agent has 
more information than the principal. Information asymmetry occurs when the principal 
does not have all the information necessary to measure the agent’s performance and take 
the necessary actions to maximize value for the shareholders (Madison, Holt, 
Kellermanns, & Ranft, 2016). Brennan, Kirwan, and Redmond (2016) studied 
information sharing between agents and principals and found that information asymmetry 
is essential for board of directors members to be effective in their role. CEO duality may 
lead to information asymmetry, and minimizing agency costs can lead to the 
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organizational goal of efficiency by reducing information asymmetry and the need to hire 
a CEO (Palanissamy, 2015).  
 Monitoring will lead to higher firm performance (Akbar et al., 2016; Dah & Frye, 
2017). Monitoring the agent involves using control systems designed to limit the 
authority of the CEO, implemented and enforced by the board of directors members 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Monitoring the agent, however, results in unavoidable costs, which 
increase when verifying the agent’s activity and can be difficult and expensive to 
implement (Eisenhardt, 1989). Additional costs to the company result in smaller returns 
for the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One way to monitor CEOs and reduce 
agency costs is through the structure of CEO compensation. Compensation is a 
monitoring mechanism of the board meant to align the goals of the principal and the 
agent (Abernethy et al., 2015). Following agency theory, the board of directors members 
adopt compensation strategies that link agent compensation to preferred outcomes 
(Kolev, Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2017).  
The challenge for boards of directors is to monitor the agent without incurring 
costs that result in a residual loss. Residual losses result when monitoring and bonding 
costs and expenses such as audit costs that the agent incurs to guarantee to the principal 
that the agents are not taking part in activities that result in wealth reduction to the 
shareholders exceed the benefits of these expenditures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Fama 
and Jensen (1983b) expanded the concept of residual loss to residual risk as the 
difference between corporate inflows and outflows for aligning the interests of the agent 
and the principal. Reducing residual risk during the decision-making process is important 
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when not compensating the agent for making decisions in the best interest of the wealth 
of the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983b).  
Bendickson et al. (2016) noted that as organizational structure has become more 
complex, agency theory is not as applicable to the business environment as it was earlier 
in the 20th century. Sikka and Stittle (2017) asserted that given a globalized economy and 
resulting dispersion of shareholders, control of the corporation by shareholders is not 
possible, and a different model of corporate governance is necessary. Social media and 
the resulting dissemination of information also has an impact on how board of directors 
members govern an organization (Bendickson et al., 2016).  
The benefits of corporate governance may differ based on the industry and 
competitive environment in which a company operates. Abraham and Singh (2016) noted 
that corporate governance scholars should consider industry information when measuring 
executive performance. Jaggia and Thosar (2017) studied companies in the finance sector 
before, during, and after the 2011–2012 financial crisis and stated that in the financial 
sector risk shifting incentive compensation should be muted during a financial crisis. 
Guillet, Seo, Kucukusta, and Lee (2013) studied corporate governance in the full-service 
and quick-service restaurant industries and found that the benefit of corporate governance 
differs by restaurant type. Quicker decision-making that results from CEO duality 
facilitates better performance in full-service restaurants; however, this is not the case in 
quick-service restaurants, possibly due to a less complex offering of products and 
services (Guillet et al., 2013).  
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Organizational complexity, environment, and industry are all factors that need to 
be taken into consideration when applying agency theory to a study (Adegbite, 2015; 
Bendickson et al., 2016; Palanissamy, 2015). Criticisms of agency theory and differing 
viewpoints have led to several other theories that replace or complement agency theory, 
including stewardship theory and stakeholder theory. 
Other Corporate Governance Theories 
 Along with the evolution of economics and the corporate structure, corporate 
governance theories, in addition to agency theory, have evolved. Scholars developed 
corporate governance theories to address perceived weaknesses in agency theory, speak 
to the differences in viewpoints from agency theory, and to meet the evolution of the 
corporation and technology. Figure 1 depicts the author’s image of stakeholder, 
stewardship, and agency theories. 
 
Figure 1. Author’s comparison of corporate governance theories. 
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Stewardship theory. Palanissamy (2015) noted stewardship theory is an 
alternative to agency theory and the most common theory for corporate governance other 
than agency theory. Agency theory grew out of the field of economics, while stewardship 
theory, originated by Donaldson and Davis (1991), grew out of the fields of psychology 
and sociology. Agency theorists and stewardship theorists agreed that the goal of 
principals is to maximize their value; however, stewardship theorists reject the self-
interest, goal conflict, and information asymmetry assumptions. 
Stewardship theorists challenge the self-interest assumption inherent in agency 
theory and assume the motivators for executives are what is in the best interest of the 
corporation, rather than the agent’s individual goals (Madison et al., 2016). Differing in 
their view of the CEO, agency theorists view the CEO as self-serving, whereas 
stewardship theorists view the CEO as trustworthy (Zona, 2016). Under agency theory 
and stewardship theory, results on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms and 
structure and financial performance are inconclusive (Abels & Martelli, 2013). The 
contrasting perspectives of stakeholders and shareholders result in different corporate 
governance structures (Ayuso, Rodriguez, Garcia-Castro, & Arino, 2014). Cabrera-
Suárez and Martín-Santana (2015) studied family firms using stewardship theory and 
contended that stewardship is inherent in family businesses because the welfare of the 
entire family is at stake. 
Stewardship theorists reject the goal conflict assumption inherent in agency 
theory and note that when a CEO achieves a corporate goal, the CEO also achieves a 
personal goal (Madison et al., 2016). Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana (2015) studied 
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CEO duality and theorized that stewardship theory might be more appropriate in family 
firms because of active family involvement. In family firms, goal conflict is not an issue 
because the CEO will have the same goals as the shareholders (Cabrera-Suárez & Martín-
Santana, 2015). In the same study, Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana found a negative 
correlation between the presence of outside directors and financial performance. 
Proponents of agency theory and stewardship theory discussed ways to minimize 
agency costs. They disagreed, however, on whether to accomplish this through separating 
the roles of CEO and chairman of the board or combining the roles. Whereas agency 
theorists posit that minimizing agency costs involves separating the CEO and chairman of 
the board, stewardship theorists state that combining the role of CEO and chairman of the 
board minimizes agency costs (Abels & Martelli, 2013). Agency theorists define agency 
costs as the costs to control the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), whereas stewardship 
theorists minimize agency costs through information sharing (Palanissamy, 2015). 
Separation of the roles presumes a free flow of information between the chairman of the 
board and the CEO (Palanissamy, 2015). Stewardship theorists, in contrast, contend that 
combining these roles allows CEOs to focus more fully on objectives, facilitates faster 
decision making, and decreases agency costs (Armeanu, Vintilă, Gherghina, & Petrache, 
2017; Miller & Yang, 2015; O’Sullivan et al., 2016; Palanissamy, 2015).  
Stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory, originated by Freeman and Reed (1983), 
differs from agency theory and stewardship theory in how theorists view the goal of the 
firm. Whereas agency theorists and stewardship theorists contend that shareholder 
interests are of primary importance, stakeholder theorists argue that the corporation exists 
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to serve the needs of other parties, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and the 
community, in addition to the shareholders (Ayuso et al., 2014; Strand & Freeman, 
2015).  
Stakeholder theorists reject the narrow view of agency theorists that agents exist 
to create profit for the principal and that firm-level characteristics are important to look at 
(Ayuso et al., 2014; Strand & Freeman, 2015). Ayuso et al. (2014) used a stakeholder 
perspective to study the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance using an international sample of companies with a sustainability strategy 
and found that stakeholder engagement positively relates to financial performance. 
Stakeholder theorists also reject the agency theorist’s assumption of information 
asymmetry. Gupta and Sharma (2014), however, studied companies in India and South 
Korea whose leaders follow a stakeholder perspective and found that more dissemination 
of information has a limited effect on financial performance.  
Stakeholder theorists reject the agency theorist’s assumption that management on 
the board of directors reduces the monitoring function of the board of directors. Collum, 
Menachemi, Kilgore, and Weech-Maldonado (2014) studied hospital board of directors 
and found no effect on financial performance if the CEO has voting rights. Palanissamy 
(2015) performed an exploratory study of corporate governance literature and contended 
there is no right or wrong structure for the board of directors. In the next section, I review 
the literature on the variable CEO compensation. 
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CEO Compensation  
Scholars widely accept that CEO compensation can either incentivize a CEO or 
result in an agency conflict (Hüttenbrink, Oehmichen, Rapp, & Wolff, 2014). For the 
principal, compensation can serve as a tool to reduce agency costs and achieve corporate 
objectives (Chen & Jermias, 2014; Srbek & Dittrich, 2016). Compensation is an essential 
part of enticing agents to work for a particular company, especially top-quality, 
experienced agents (Huang et al., 2017). Agents’ time is a marketable asset, and thus 
their compensation must equate with the market value of their services (Fama, 1980).  
The foundation of agency theory is whether agents, particularly CEOs, receive 
compensation for positive performance outcomes (Srbek & Dittrich, 2016). To facilitate 
positive performance outcomes, the board of directors’ members adopts compensation 
strategies that link agent compensation to shareholders’ preferred outcome of increased 
financial performance (Kolev et al., 2017). Compensation for CEOs includes salary, 
performance-linked compensation such as cash bonuses, and equity compensation such 
as stock options and restricted stock (Song & Wan, 2017). Performance-linked 
compensation may attract and retain managers who are risk averse and thus alleviate 
agency costs (Chen & Jermias, 2014). Equity compensation may align the interests of 
CEOs with the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Performance-linked and equity compensation distribute the risk between the principal and 
the agent more evenly (Hüttenbrink et al., 2014).  
Scholars have studied CEO compensation as the independent and dependent 
variables. Brockman, Lee, and Salas (2016) studied the relationship between CEO skill 
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level and compensation and found that CEOs with more generalist skills receive higher 
compensation than those with specialized skills. Brockman et al. speculated that complex 
organizations are more in need of general skills than specific skills. Alves, Couto, and 
Francisco (2016) studied the relationship between CEO education level and 
compensation and found that CEOs with a higher level of education receive lower 
compensation than their counterparts. In contrast with the work of Brockman et al., Alves 
et al. noted that less educated CEOs might have knowledge that is more specific and be 
more entrenched in the organization and thus overpaid. Humphery-Jenner, Lisic, Nanda, 
and Silveri (2016) studied the relationship between CEO confidence and compensation 
and found a positive relationship. Overconfident CEOs tend to hold a positive view of the 
prospects of the company and underestimate risk, and thus highly confident CEOs 
negotiate higher levels of options and equity compensation (Humphery-Jenner et al., 
2016). Gan and Park (2016) studied the relationship between CEO managerial ability and 
pay-for-performance sensitivity and found that pay-for-performance increases based on 
the ability of the CEO. 
Scholars have attempted to explain what drives the mixed results regarding CEO 
compensation and firm performance (Abraham & Singh, 2016; Huang et al., 2017; 
Jermias & Gani, 2014). Salaries and cash bonuses are static and behavior oriented, 
whereas equity compensation is typically a variable amount and performance linked and 
considered outcome oriented (Zona, 2016). Shue and Townsend (2017) studied 
companies listed on the S&P 1500 from 1992 to 2010 and found that option grants that 
are the same each year contributed to the increase in CEO compensation. Zona (2016) 
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studied the effect of stock option compensation and CEO tenure and found that when 
CEOs receive a large number of stock options early in their tenure, they may restrict their 
investment in research and development and in innovation, which increases financial 
performance. Huang et al. (2017) studied the effect of labor unions on executive 
compensation and found that companies with strong unions pay their CEOs less than 
companies without strong unions do, especially prior to union contract negotiations.  
The purpose of compensation is to provide an incentive to an individual to 
achieve short-term and long-term goals, which ultimately enhances value to the 
stockholders (Koch, Waggoner, & Wall, 2017). Agents may focus on short-term personal 
gains rather than the long-term interests of the shareholders. For example, dos Santos 
(2015) found that agents will focus on short-term results when compensated based on 
short-term measures and long-term results when compensated on long-term measures. 
Alves et al. (2016) studied CEO compensation regarding fixed versus variable 
compensation and found that nonfixed compensation does not necessarily align the 
interests of the CEO with firm performance. Alves et al. theorized that CEOs are more 
interested in cash compensation than stock-based incentives because of the liquidity of 
cash.  
Compensation for CEOs can also include nonmonetary rewards and perquisites, 
such as the use of a private jet and contractual payments such as severance and change in 
control payments. A CEO receives a contractual severance payment typically if 
terminated without cause and a change in control payment when there is a transaction, 
such as an acquisition, and the CEO loses his or her job (Kusumaningtias, Ludigdo, 
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Irianto, & Mulawarman, 2016). Contracts for these types of payments serve to 
compensate CEOs for the uncertainty associated with the position and to ensure CEOs act 
in the best interest of the shareholders in the face of losing their position (Kusumaningtias 
et al., 2016). At the annual meeting, shareholders can terminate a CEO who they do not 
feel has the maximization of shareholder wealth as a priority (Kusumaningtias et al., 
2016). Gao and Li (2015) studied CEO compensation from 1999 to 2011 and found that 
CEOs of publicly traded companies receive 30% more than the CEOs of private 
companies, which indicated a weak pay-for-performance link exists privately held firms, 
possibly due to the liquidity of stock in a private firm.  
Regulation minimizes risk-taking (Jaggia & Thosar, 2017). SOX mandated strict 
auditing practices, which led to an increase in diligence over executive compensation and 
performance incentives (Zalewska, 2014). In 2011, the SEC issued regulations specifying 
that shareholders of public companies with a market capitalization greater than $75 
million have to approve executive pay packages once every three years (Siciliano, 2014). 
In the United Kingdom, following a series of corporate scandals that degraded public 
confidence, regulators issued recommendations such as the Cadbury Report and the 
Greenbury Report in an attempt to restore public confidence and better align CEO pay 
with performance (Abernethy et al., 2015). Policymakers have implemented regulation 
around the world. However, none has come up with a model to relate pay to performance 
(Abraham & Singh, 2016). Azeez (2015) found that in Sri Lanka, CEO duality and a 
smaller board size affects firm performance, but the presence of nonexecutive directors 
on the board did not affect firm performance. Jaggia and Thosar (2017) studied CEO 
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compensation in the finance sector before and after the 2011-2012 financial crisis and 
found a strong relationship existed between CEO compensation and financial 
performance. The relationship was stronger in larger companies, particularly prior to the 
financial crisis (Jaggia & Thosar, 2017). Compensation practices are a concern for 
regulators in the finance sector and could affect economic stability (Jaggia & Thosar, 
2017). Abernethy et al. (2015) studied executive compensation reform and financial 
performance in Nigeria and found that early adoption of regulation has a positive effect 
on public perception, but late adopters of regulation had better financial performance.  
Compensation for CEOs on the S&P 500 index increased 221% from $2.9 million 
in 1992 to $9.3 million in 2001 (Shue & Townsend, 2017). Scholars who have studied 
increases in CEO compensation and the relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm performance obtained mixed results and began to look at other factors that could 
lead to the increase in CEO compensation (Chen & Jermias, 2014; Soltani, 2014).  
Abernethy et al. (2015) found although compensation is a monitoring mechanism to align 
the interest of the principal and agent when CEOs gain power over setting their 
compensation, the company experiences adverse consequences. When the chairman of 
the board of directors is also the CEO, the CEO is in a position to exercise influence on 
CEO compensation (Abernethy et al., 2015). When CEO duality exists, the CEO has 
more power over CEO compensation, and thus the CEO retains valuable resources that 




Board structure is a tool that board of directors’ members use to address the 
agency problem (Srbek & Dittrich, 2016). However, CEO duality is a controversial issue 
among scholars and business leaders (Krenn, 2014; Miller & Yang, 2015). Agency 
theorists posited that CEO duality decreases board members’ ability to monitor the CEO, 
increases agency costs, and leads to negative financial performance (Amzaleg et al., 
2014; De Maere, Jorissen, & Uhlaner, 2014; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jermias & Gani, 
2014; Srbek & Dittrich, 2016). Prior research regarding the relationship between CEO 
duality and financial performance has been inconclusive (Azeez, 2015; Dembo & 
Rasaratnam, 2014; Miller & Yang, 2015; Rashid, 2015; Soltani, 2014; Tang, 2017).  
CEO duality may allow CEOs to dominate the board of directors and shift the 
power to the CEOs. If management gains control of the board, then management may 
decide that collusion and expropriation of wealth are better than competition among 
management (Fama, 1980). Powerful CEOs, as measured by the (a) number of board 
committees to which the CEO belongs, (b) length of CEO tenure, (c) size of the board, 
(d) number of independent directors of the board, and (e) ownership concentration, may 
minimize their own compensation risk by choosing easier to reach vesting targets 
(Abernethy et al., 2015). Amzaleg et al. (2014) found that CEOs who are also chairmen 
of the board are able to exercise more control over their compensation amount and 
structure. 
CEO duality affects the monitoring function of the board of directors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b). Without monitoring, CEOs may abuse their power, especially if they also 
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serve as chairman of the board of directors (Cabrera-Suárez & Martín-Santana, 2015). 
CEO duality may be appropriate in family businesses because the health and welfare of 
the family are at stake (Cabrera-Suárez & Martín-Santana, 2015). Cabrera-Suárez and 
Martín-Santana (2015) studied CEO duality in Spanish family-owned firms and found 
that the presence of CEO duality increases financial performance. In contrast, Collum et 
al. (2014) studied the board of directors of hospitals and the degree of involvement 
management had with decision making and found that CEO voting rights on a hospital 
board of directors did not affect hospital financial performance. 
CEO duality is a common practice in U.S. firms (Jermias & Gani, 2014). Jermias 
and Gani (2014) studied CEO duality and financial performance and found that 78% of 
their sample had a board structure that included CEO duality and that CEO duality 
negatively affected firm performance. Srbek and Dittrich (2016) studied CEO duality and 
financial performance of publicly traded companies on U.S. stock exchanges and found 
that CEO compensation is higher when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, 
although there are differences between sectors. 
The practice of separating the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the board is 
increasing around the world (Palanissamy, 2015). Gupta and Sharma (2014) studied the 
relationship between governance and firm performance in companies in India and South 
Korea whose leaders follow a stakeholder perspective and found that India has more 
stringent corporate governance practices as opposed to South Korea, but the practices had 
a limited effect on financial performance. Adegbite (2015) studied corporate governance 
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in the weak institutional setting of Nigeria and found that CEO duality inhibited board 
independence.  
 Scholars have observed mixed results regarding CEO duality based on the 
industry studied. Guillet et al. (2013) studied CEO duality in the U.S. restaurant industry 
and found that CEO duality has a positive relationship on firm performance, theorizing 
that, in the complex operations of the restaurant industry, combining the roles of the CEO 
and chairman of the board may facilitate decision making. O’Sullivan et al. (2016) 
studied CEO duality in the banking industry and found no correlation between CEO 
duality and bank performance, but found different results during a crisis.  
CEO duality reduces transparency through reduced access and results in withheld 
information (Palanissamy, 2015). Srbek and Dittrich (2016) speculated that CEO 
compensation increases with legislation as well as competitive markets for CEOs. 
Samaha, Khlif, and Hussainey (2015) performed a meta-analysis of 64 empirical studies 
and found a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and voluntary 
information disclosure prior to 2002, when company leaders were making financial 
disclosures and an insignificant relationship thereafter. 
Scholars have studied the relationship between CEO duality and corporate 
bankruptcy. DeMaere et al. (2014) studied the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics, CEO duality, and found that, consistent with agency theory, the 
separation of the CEO and the chairman of the board lowers the risk of bankruptcy. 
Elshahat, Elshahat, and Rao (2015) studied CEO duality as a component of corporate 
governance and found that corporate governance did contribute significantly to a 
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bankruptcy prediction but speculated that the bankruptcy prediction model is not 
generalizable to all firms. The separation of the CEO and chairman of the board roles 
increases board vigilance and minimizes shareholders’ risk of bankruptcy (DeMaere et 
al., 2014). 
CEO duality is a controversial issue among scholars and business leaders when 
studied from several perspectives including in family firms, different countries, and 
different industries (Krenn, 2014; Miller & Yang, 2015).  Results have been mixed 
indicating other factors exist when studying CEO duality.   
Return on Equity 
 ROE is a measure of financial performance and Azeez (2015) hypothesized that 
an independent corporate governance structure leads to increased corporate financial 
performance. Researchers have debated the effect of corporate governance on corporate 
financial performance (Akbar et al., 2016; Azeez, 2015). Financial performance is the 
method used to assess the performance of a CEO and is a reflection of an organization’s 
success (Pugliese, Minichilli, & Zattoni, 2014; Rostami, Rostami, & Kohansal, 2016). 
Measures of financial performance fall into the categories of market-based 
(investor returns) and accounting based performance (accounting returns) (Azeez, 2015). 
Market-based measures include Tobin’s Q, which is a market-valuation-based measure of 
firm performance and a proxy for investment opportunities, a company’s stock price, and 
market value, whereas accounting-based measures include ROE and ROA (Peni, 2014). 
Corporate governance scholars widely use and accept accounting-based measures (Peni, 
2014). Dawar (2014) used ROA and ROE to measure firm performance in listed Indian 
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companies from 2003 to 2012. Azeez (2015) used ROA, ROE, and earnings per share to 
measure firm performance in Sri Lankan companies. Rodriguez-Fernandez (2015) used 
ROA and ROE to measure the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
firm performance. Akbar et al. (2016) used ROA and Tobin’s Q to study corporate 
governance and had the same results with each measure. Peni (2014) used ROA and 
Tobin’s Q to measure the relationship between CEO and board chair characteristics and 
firm performance.  
Other CEO characteristics that affect corporate financial performance include 
CEO tenure, CEO age, and firm size. CEO tenure may relate to business failure 
(Armeanu et al., 2017). Zona (2016) studied the effect of CEO tenure on research and 
development investment and theorized that regulators should provide detailed 
prescriptions regarding corporate governance. Peni (2014) studied the relationship 
between CEO age and firm financial performance and found a positive relationship. 
Armeanu et al. (2017) found mixed results when examining the relationship between firm 
size and business failure. CEO tenure, CEO age, and firm size were each control 
variables in this study. 
Many factors exist that could impact financial performance including the 
independent variables of this study, CEO compensation and CEO duality, and the control 
variable of CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size.  Results have been mixed, however, 
regarding the impact of these factors financial performance (Akbar et al., 2016; Azeez, 
2015). In this study, I researched whether there was a relationship between CEO 
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compensation, CEO duality, and ROE. I controlled for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm 
size, with a sample time frame following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA). 
The Dodd-Frank Act  
Agency theory has influenced regulators for decades (Zona, 2016). Hüttenbrink et 
al. (2014) contended that shareholder protection mechanisms, such as regulation, reduce 
agency dilemma and augment weak regulations regarding disclosure increase agency 
costs. Regulation became an urgent priority for U.S. regulators following the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, as problems in a financial system can have a tremendous effect on an 
entire economy (Sorokina & Thornton, 2016). In response to the financial crisis, 
President Obama signed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, known as 
DFA, into law on July 21, 2010 (Dimitrov, Palia, & Tang, 2015; Stunda, 2016). The 
passage of the DFA represented the largest overhaul of a financial system since the 1930s 
(Sorokina & Thornton, 2016; Williams, 2015; Ziegler & Woolley, 2016).  
Provisions in the DFA increased company reporting requirements as well as the 
risk of regulatory penalties (Dmitrov, Palia, & Tang, 2014). Several sections of the DFA 
serve to increase the transparency of company reporting (SEC, 2010). Section 972 of the 
DFA requires the disclosure of the structure of the board of directors, including if CEO 
duality exists and an explanation as to why in order to give shareholders the information 
they need to evaluate company leadership (Ziegler & Woolley, 2016).  Section 951 of the 
DFA requires annual approval of executive compensation (Paulo & Le Roux, 2016). 
Section 953(b) of the DFA requires disclosure of the pay ratio of the CEO to the average 
worker (Ziegler & Woolley, 2016).   
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An increase in corporate governance regulation could have a positive effect on 
company performance. Akbar et al. (2016) studied nonfinancial companies in the United 
Kingdom from 1999 to 2009 and found that leaders of companies with a low level of 
governance compliance that increase their governance send a positive signal to the 
market that results in better financial performance. Stunda (2016) studied the effect on 
financial institutions and investors five years prior and five years after the passage of the 
DFA and found a significant effect on financial institutions, possibly due to the cost of 
risk passed to the investor. Dimitrov et al. (2015) studied the effect of the passage of the 
DFA on company credit ratings and found that, in line with congress’ intention of the 
DFA, passage increased the quality of credit ratings. Dimitrov et al. weighed whether the 
DFA improved performance or if the increase in legal and regulatory penalties had a 
negative effect on credit ratings possibly due to the increased cost of compliance. 
Hüttenbrink et al. (2014) studied the executive compensation of companies between 2005 
and 2008 in the regulated environments of the European Union and the United States and 
found strong regulations reduced agency costs incurred through internal mechanisms. In 
contrast, Gupta and Sharma (2014) studied the relationship between governance and firm 
performance in companies in India and South Korea and found that India had more 
stringent corporate governance practices as opposed to South Korea, but the practices had 
a limited effect on financial performance.  
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size.  The time period for the study was during the year 
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of  2016, which follows the passage of the DFA. Agency theory was the theoretical 
framework for this study. Fama and Jensen (1983b) posited that CEOs’ actions will more 
likely support the needs of the shareholders when their compensation package aligns with 
firm performance. Amzaleg et al. (2014) argued that combining the roles of CEO and 
chairman of the board decreases the ability of the members of the board of directors to 
monitor the actions of the CEO and results in a conflict of interest. Scholars have sought 
to verify these agency theory assumptions, but obtained mixed results (Cabrera-Suárez & 
Martín-Santana, 2015; Zona, 2016).  
Summary and Transition  
In this section, I provided the background of the problem that some boards of 
directors’ members do not know the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO 
duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The purpose 
of this study which was to examine the relationship between these variables. I specified 
the research questions and hypotheses, a short review of the theoretical framework for the 
study, operational definitions to help the reader understand some of the terms used in the 
study, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the study and the significance of the 
study. The findings from this study may contribute to leaders’ understanding of the 
optimal board of directors’ structure.  As a community and society, the findings may 
contribute to positive social change by building confidence in capital markets. Finally, I 
presented a comprehensive review of the professional and academic literature, including 
a discussion of agency theory as well as other corporate governance theories, followed by 
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a review of the current literature on CEO compensation, CEO duality, financial 
performance and the importance of the DFA.  
In Section 2, I describe the methods that I used to conduct the study, which 
includes the role of the researcher, participants, research method, research design, 
population, and sampling. I also discuss data collection and analysis, as well as internal 
and external validity. In Section 3, I present the findings of the study, the application to 
professional practice, and the implications for social change. I conclude with 





Section 2: The Project 
In this section, I provide details regarding the role of the researcher, participants 
of the study, research method and design, the population, instrumentation and data 
collection, and data analysis. Each topic that I discuss may help to acquire and analyze 
data relevant to addressing the research question. I also discuss ethical research and 
threats to study validity in this section.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE. I controlled for CEO 
age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The independent variables were CEO compensation and 
CEO duality for the companys 2016 fiscal year. The dependent variable was ROE. The 
control variables were CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The target population was 
the archival data records of companies listed on the S&P 500 index. The implications for 
positive social change included the potential for board of directors members to implement 
best practices contributing to reduced shareholder conflicts, less litigation, higher ROE, 
and enhanced investor confidence benefiting emerging economies and local communities.  
Role of the Researcher 
The role of a quantitative researcher includes designing a study, collecting and 
organizing data, testing the hypothesis, and applying appropriate analytics to interpret the 
study data related to the research question (Butina, Campbell, & Miller, 2015; Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2016). My role was to collect publicly available data from the SEC’s Electronic 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database, which is an archival source, 
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and analyze data using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. As 
my study involved publicly traded companies in the US, data from archival sources, 
human participants, and confidentiality protocols per The Belmont Report were not 
applicable. The Belmont Report does not apply when confidentiality protocols are not 
applicable and there are no human participants (Kowalski, Hutchinson, & Mrdjenovich, 
2017; Miracle, 2016; U.S Department of Health & Human Services, 2018).  
The role of the researcher in a quantitative study is to be detached, objective, and 
avoid researcher bias, which refers to any influence that could distort data or conclusions 
(Butina et al., 2015; Leedy & Ormrod, 2016; Shepperd, 2015). The use of archival data 
can mitigate the risk of researcher bias as the data was collected by others (Alves et al., 
2016; Peni, 2014). I used randomly chosen archival data records of companies from the 
S&P 500 index for my study. An estimate of the relationship between variables is less 
likely to be biased if the sample is selected randomly from a population (Bettany-Saltikov 
& Whittaker, 2014; Bland & Tobbell, 2015). I have over 20 years of experience as an 
accountant. Throughout my career, I developed an interest in the topics of CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and financial ratios including ROE, which facilitates my 
understanding of the dependent and independent variables. I did not have a personal 
working relationship with any of the companies in the target population.  
Participants 
The target population for this study included all companies listed on the S&P 500 
index in 2016. I obtained the initial sample of S&P 500 index companies from the 
Compustat database. Researchers use the Compustat database to acquire company and 
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index information. For example, Chen and Jermias (2014) and Hill et al. (2016) used the 
Compustat S&P 500 database to explore the relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm performance. Duru, Iyengar, and Zampelli (2016) used the Compustat database to 
explore the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.  
All company archival data were sourced from the EDGAR database, which is a 
publicly available database on the SEC website. The EDGAR database is a common 
source for researchers to obtain company information. Using archival data increases 
external validity and saves time and expense (Davis-Kean, Jager, & Maslowsky, 2015; 
Fanning, 2014; Ikeda, 2016).  
Leaders of publicly traded companies file a Form 10-K report (annual report) and 
DEF14 A report (proxy statement) annually with the SEC. The filing of the annual report 
and proxy statement is mandatory for publicly traded companies (Kang, Park, & Han, 
2018). These reports are available for free through the SECs EDGAR database. Inputting 
the name of the company or the company stock symbol returns all reports filed with the 
SEC for the history of the company sorted by date which includes the annual report and 
proxy statement. The annual report contains company information including net income 
and shareholders’ equity (Kang et al., 2018). I used annual report information to compute 
the dependent variable ROE and total assets, which I used for the control variable firm 
size. The proxy statement contains CEO compensation and CEO duality information 
(Melton, Nunn, & Sugar 2015; Tinaikar, 2017). I used the proxy statement to obtain CEO 
compensation and CEO duality information, which were the independent variables, and 
CEO age and CEO tenure, which were both control variables. To examine the research 
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question and be included in the sample, a company must (a) have appeared on the S&P 
500 index each day in 2016, (b) have filed an annual report with the SEC for their 2016 
fiscal year, (c) have a proxy statement filed with the SEC for their fiscal 2016 year, (d) 
have the same CEO for their entire fiscal 2016 year, and (e) have the same chairman of 
the board for their entire fiscal 2016 year.   
Research Method and Design  
I used a quantitative method and a correlational design for this study. The choice 
of method and design involves exploring different research alternatives (Luft & Shields, 
2014; Quick & Hall, 2015). My choice of method and design were made to facilitate the 
purpose of the study. 
Research Method 
The three main methods for conducting research are quantitative, qualitative, and 
mixed methods (Butina et al., 2015; Leedy & Ormrod, 2016; Tavakol & Sandars, 2014). 
Researchers use the quantitative method to examine numerical data objectively and 
conduct statistical analyses to test hypotheses (Ingham-Broomfield, 2016; Tavakol & 
Sandars, 2014; Wells & Stage, 2015). Researchers use the qualitative method primarily to 
explore characteristics or complexities of a particular phenomenon that cannot be reduced 
to a numerical value (Butina et al., 2015; Leedy & Ormrod, 2016; Plano Clark, 2017). A 
qualitative method was inappropriate for my study because qualitative researchers focus 
on establishing a theory, definitions, and the understanding of a phenomenon (Butina et 
al., 2015; Leedy & Ormrod).  
Most quantitative researchers have a positivist paradigm and an objective reality 
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viewpoint, whereas many qualitative researchers have a naturalistic paradigm and view 
the world through a subjective reality (Ingham-Broomfield, 2016; Luft & Shields, 2014; 
Quick & Hall, 2015; Tavakol & Sandars, 2014). Mixed methods research includes 
elements of quantitative and qualitative research to provide more evidence and address 
questions that researchers cannot use the quantitative approach or the qualitative 
approach alone to answer (Butina et al., 2015; Ingham-Broomfield, 2016; Plano Clark, 
2017). The quantitative method was the appropriate method for this study because I have 
a positivist paradigm, and the goal of my research was to examine the objective 
relationship between variables and test hypotheses.  
Research Design 
 The three major designs in quantitative descriptive research are experimental, 
quasi-experimental, and correlational (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Researchers select an 
experimental design to assess cause-and-effect relationships and include control and 
experimental groups (Ingham-Broomfield, 2016; Leedy & Ormrod, 2016; Schweizer & 
Furley, 2016). A quasi-experimental design omits randomization from an experimental 
design (May et al., 2014). Researchers select a quasi-experimental design to leverage 
variation among participants and to analyze results based on different factors such as 
geographic location (May et al., 2014). Researchers select a correlational design to 
explore the extent of a relationship between two or more variables and involves using 
natural and continuous variables from the selected population, where no manipulation of 
the variable is necessary (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016; Prion & Haerling, 2014). As the basis 
of the present topic of research was not an ambiguous problem or cause and effect but 
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involves a random sample, I chose a correlational design. Sheikh, Shah, & Akbar (2018) 
used a correlational design to examine the relationship between CEO compensation and 
financial performance from 2007 to 2012. Miller and Yang (2015) also used a 
correlational design to examine the relationship between CEO duality and financial 
performance from 1996 to 2012. 
Population and Sampling  
The target population for this study included archival data records of companies 
listed on the S&P 500 index. After controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, I 
chose companies listed on the S&P 500 index as the population because the research 
question was to examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and 
ROE. Firms listed on the S&P 500 index are a good cross-section of large, publicly 
traded firms in the United States (Gao & Li, 2015; Jung & Subramanian, 2017; Peni, 
2014).   
The sample for this study was the archival data records from a random sample of 
68 of the 500 companies listed on the S&P 500 index in 2016. Researchers sample a 
population when it is time-consuming, expensive, or impractical to survey an entire 
population (Tavakol & Sandars, 2014). Companies listed on the S&P 500 index are from 
varying industries and using a sample that has a wide spectrum of industries supports the 
generalization of findings (Gao & Li, 2015; Haslam, Tsitsianis, Lehman, Andersson, & 
Malamatenios, 2018; Öztürk & Stengos, 2017). 
I used a probabilistic technique to select a sample of firms listed on the S&P 500 
index in 2016.  Probabilistic and nonprobability sampling are the two primary methods of 
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collecting samples (Carman, Clark, Wolf, & Moon, 2015; Fielding, Beattie, O’Reilly, 
McMaster, & The AusQoL Group, 2016; Maas-Hebner et al., 2015). Probabilistic 
sampling is used when the researcher desires to give each unit in the target population an 
equal chance of being selected (Fielding et al., 2016; Maas-Hebner et al., 2015).  The 
advantages of probabilistic sampling include time efficiency, ease of sampling, and less 
researcher judgment (Fielding et al., 2016). A disadvantage of probabilistic sampling is 
that a representative sample is not generated (Fielding et al., 2016). Non-probabilistic 
sampling is used when a random element is not desired (Fielding et al., 2016).  I rejected 
non-probabilistic sampling because the purpose of my study was to use a sample to 
represent the population. I desired to give each unit in the population an equal chance of 
selection and probabilistic sampling was the most appropriate method. 
The types of probabilistic sampling include (a) simple random, (b) stratified, (c) 
cluster, and (d) systematic (Fielding et al., 2016; Maas-Hebner et al., 2015). Researchers 
employ the simple random sampling technique to allow for an equal probability of 
selection of each unit within the population (Fielding et al., 2016). Researchers employ 
the stratified sampling technique when the researcher desires to classify the population 
based on similar attributes such as size or revenue (Fielding et al., 2016; Maas-Hebner et 
al., 2015). Researchers employ the cluster sampling technique when the researcher 
desires to divide the population based on similar attributes (Fielding et al., 2016).  The 
systematic sampling technique allows the researcher to sample each “nth” element 
available (Fielding et al., 2016). I desired to give each unit in the population an equal 
chance of selection and probabilistic simple random sampling was the most appropriate 
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method. The advantages of simple random sampling include an equal probability of 
selection that is likely to produce a representative sample of the population, and that 
sample bias is minimized (Carman et al., 2015; Fielding et al., 2016). The disadvantages 
of simple random sampling are the difficulty and expense to achieve, and the sample may 
not be representative of the population leading to a false conclusion (Carman et al., 2015; 
Fielding et al., 2016).   
Researchers should take sample size into consideration to ensure the 
generalizability of the findings of the research (Anderson et al., 2015). I determined the 
needed sample size for a hierarchical linear regression fixed model, R2 increase using the 
G*Power 3.1 Version 3.1 software program (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
G*Power is statistical software that researchers use to determine a priori sample size 
(Faul et al., 2009; Macfarlane et al., 2015). Researchers use a priori power analysis to 
estimate the size of the sample prior to conducting the research (Hazra & Gogtay, 2016; 
Lapresa, Alvarez, Anguera, Arana, & Garzon, 2015; Walum, Waldman, & Young, 2016). 
To determine the sample size, researchers must estimate the effect size, alpha level, and 
sufficient power (Hazra & Gogtay, 2016; McNeish & Stapleton, 2016; Nuijten, van 
Assen, Veldkamp, & Wicherts, 2015). As a priori power analysis, assuming a medium 
effect size (f 2 = .15) and an alpha level of α = .05, the needed sample size to achieve 
sufficient power (.80) was 68 companies (See Appendix A).  
In order to determine the sample companies, annual data for all 500 S&P 
companies obtained from the Compustat S&P 500 database was entered into a 
spreadsheet. In an additional column, using the RAND function in Microsoft Excel®, a 
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column of random numbers was created, one for each company. The dataset of 500 
companies was then sorted low-to-high based on the random values in this new 
column. The first 68 companies were selected for the study based on the results of the 
power analysis. Brown (2016), Jones, Li, and Cannella (2015), and Tînjală, Pantea, and 
Buglea (2015) used the RAND function in Microsoft Excel® to select a random sample 
of firms to study components of their financial performance. 
I relied on archival data for this study. Inclusion in the sample required that a 
company (a) appeared on the S&P 500 index each day in 2016, (b) have an annual report 
filed with the SEC for their 2016 fiscal year, (c) have a proxy statement filed with the 
SEC for their fiscal 2016 year, (d) have the same CEO for their entire fiscal 2016 year, 
and (e) have the same chairman of the board for their entire fiscal 2016 year.  
Ethical Research 
The responsibility of a researcher is to ensure ethical research protocols are 
followed (Ingham-Broomfield, 2016; Kowalski et al., 2017; Tavakol & Sandars, 2014). 
The participants for this study were a random sample of publicly traded companies listed 
on the S&P 500 index in 2016. Information on the companies was publicly available; 
therefore, there were no human participants, and a consent form was not necessary. I 
began data collection after receiving IRB approval (08-03-18-0062847) from Walden 
University. I stored data gathered on the internal hard drive of my personal computer 
during the study period and then transferred data to a flash drive and deleted data from 
my personal computer via the trash bin. I also used a Kill Disk to erase the master boot 
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record from my computer. I will maintain data gathered and analyzed for this study for 5 
years on a flash drive and will destroy the flash drive after the 5-year period elapses.  
Data Collection Instruments 
I used Microsoft Excel® to collect, filter, and process the raw data. The raw data 
for the study were sourced from the SEC’s EDGAR database. The leaders of all 
companies that trade on stock exchanges in the United States must file their annual 
reports and proxy statements through the EDGAR database (Loughran & McDonald, 
2017). Other databases, such as Execucomp, received consideration, but the EDGAR 
database contains all needed information and was freely available on the Internet and thus 
were used.  
Instrument 
Researchers use instruments to collect data including surveys, interviews, and 
experiments (Birley & Moreland, 2014; Hagan, 2014). Data were collected from archival 
sources, and I used Microsoft Excel® to collect, filter, and process raw data. Archival 
sources are a valid research collection technique (Davis-Kean et al., 2015; Fanning, 2014; 
Ikeda, 2016). I extracted the raw data from the SEC’s EDGAR database. The EDGAR 
database is a publicly available database maintained by the SEC which contains the 
company annual report and proxy statement information needed for this study (Loughran 
& McDonald, 2017).   
The four levels (scales) of data measurement are nominal, ordinal, interval, and 
ratio (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). Nominal data is measured in categories 
without a numerical or orderly value (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). Ordinal data 
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also has no numerical value but is orderly (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014).   
Interval data has equal intervals on a measurement scale, but no theoretical zero point 
(Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). Ratio data has equal intervals where meaningful 
ratios can be made with a theoretical zero point on the measurement scale (Bettany-
Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). The following Table 2 shows the levels (scales) of data 
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A total of six variables were used in the analysis. The two predictor variables 
were CEO compensation and CEO duality. The dependent variable was ROE, and the 
three control variables were CEO tenure, CEO age, and firm size.  
CEO compensation.  I measured the first independent variable, CEO 
compensation, using the total dollar value of compensation, consisting of base salary, 
bonus, stock awards, and stock option values made to the CEO in a year. Broye et al. 
(2017), Hüttenbrink et al. (2014), and Jaggia and Thosar (2017) measured CEO 
compensation using the total dollar value of compensation. This information was 
measured in thousands of dollars and was available in and obtained from the summary 
compensation table within the company’s proxy statement, which leaders must file with 
the SEC for the fiscal year (Loughran & McDonald, 2017). Proxy statements are publicly 
available documents on the SEC website. 
CEO duality. I measured the second independent variable, CEO duality, with a 
nominal level of measurement by assigning a value of 1 when the CEO also serves as the 
chairman of the board and a 0 otherwise. The information was available in, and obtained 
from, the company’s proxy statement, which is a required filing with the SEC for the 
fiscal year. Proxy statements are publicly available documents on the SEC website. 
Armeanu et al. (2017), Broye et al. (2017), Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana (2015), 




Return on equity. I measured the dependent variable, financial performance, 
based on the financial measure ROE. Financial measures provide more relevant data 
regarding the economic performance of a company than do market or stock-based 
measures (Ahamed, Almsafir, & Al Smadi, 2014). The information was available in, and 
obtained from, the company’s annual report, which is a required filing with the SEC for 
the fiscal year. Annual reports are publicly available documents on the SEC website. 
Broye et al. (2017), Jaggia and Thosar (2017), and Zona (2016) used ROE as a measure 
of firm performance. 
CEO tenure. CEO tenure may relate to business failure (Armeanu et al., 2017). 
CEO tenure was a control variable that I measured as the number of years the CEO has 
held the CEO position. Clifford and Lindsey (2016) and Gan and Park (2016) used CEO 
tenure as a control variable to examine CEO compensation and firm performance. The 
information was available in a company’s proxy statement, which leaders must file with 
the SEC for the fiscal year. Proxy statements are publicly available documents on the 
SEC website. 
CEO age. CEO experience can positively relate to firm performance (Peni, 2014). 
CEO age was a control variable that I measured as the age of the CEO in years. Gan and 
Park (2016) and Peni (2014) used CEO age as a control variable to examine CEO 
compensation and firm performance. The information was available in the company’s 
proxy statement, which company leaders must file with the SEC for the fiscal year. Proxy 
statements are publicly available documents on the SEC website. 
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 Firm size. Scholars have speculated that growth in CEO compensation may be 
due to a growth in firm size (Shue & Townsend, 2017). Firm size may have an effect on 
performance (Jermias & Gani, 2014). I used total assets to control for firm size. Huang et 
al. (2017) and Jermias and Gani (2014) used firm size, as calculated as total assets, as a 
control variable to examine CEO compensation and firm performance. The information 
was available in, and obtained from, the company’s annual report, which is a required 
filing with the SEC for the fiscal year. Annual reports are publicly available documents 
on the SEC website. 
Data Collection Technique 
The research question for this study was if a relationship exists between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
firm size. I used archival data for this study. An advantage of using archival data is that it 
increases external validity and saves time and expense, however, the researcher must 
assume that data were not manipulated which is a disadvantage (Davis-Kean et al., 2015; 
Fanning, 2014; Ikeda, 2016). Alves et al. (2016), Brockman et al. (2016), and Ntim, 
Lindop, Osei, and Thomas (2015) used archival data to examine executive compensation 
and firm performance. Broye et al. (2017) used archival data to examine CEO duality. 
The source of the archival data was the SECs EDGAR database. The SEC has 
mandatory disclosure requirements for leaders of public companies to report company 
data annually on Form 10-K and executive compensation in an annual proxy statement 
(Kang et al., 2018). The annual report contains company information including net 
income and shareholders’ equity (Kang et al., 2018). The proxy statement contains CEO 
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compensation and CEO duality information (Melton et al., 2015; Tinaikar, 2017).  The 
information I used for this study came from these forms. Gao, Hwang, and Wu (2017) 
used the EDGAR database to extract CEO compensation information and Kang et al. 
(2018) used the EDGAR database to obtain firm performance information. Miller and 
Yang (2015) used the EDGAR database to extract CEO duality information. 
Annual reports and proxy statements are publicly available at no fee to the public 
through the SECs EDGAR database which is a searchable database. The SEC’s EDGAR 
database is a U.S. government website and database and has been providing access to 
company required SEC filings since 1996 (Drake et al., 2015). The EDGAR database is a 
first-source repository for mandatory company SEC filings (Loughran & McDonald, 
2017). Inputting the name of the company or the company stock symbol returns all 
reports filed with the SEC for the history of the company sorted by date which includes 
the annual report and proxy statement. I searched by date and downloaded the company’s 
2016 annual report and proxy statement.  
From the annual report, I collected net income after tax from the company income 
statement and total shareholder equity from the company balance sheet which I inputted 
into separate columns in Microsoft Excel®. In the next column, I used these two numbers 
to compute the dependent variable, return on equity. From the balance sheet in the annual 
report, I inputted the company’s total assets, the control variable firm size, into Microsoft 
Excel®. From the proxy statement, I collected CEO compensation data from the 
summary compensation table. The summary compensation table is an SEC-required 
disclosure in company proxy statements (Melton et al., 2015). I entered the total CEO 
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compensation, one of the independent variables, into a column in Microsoft Excel®. I 
collected CEO duality data, the second independent variable, also from the company’s 
proxy statement in their required board leadership structure section. I entered a 1 if the 
CEO was also the Chairman of the Board and a 0 if not into Microsoft Excel® for each 
company in the sample. Also, in the proxy statement, I searched for the CEO’s biography 
where I obtained the CEO’s age, a control variable, and how long they have been CEO of 
the company, another control variable. I excluded companies with missing data from the 
sample.   
Data Analysis  
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The research question was as follows: 
RQ1: Is there a significant relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, 
and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size?  
The null and alternative hypotheses were as follows: 
H01: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation 
and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
H02: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
52 
 
ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
I used a hierarchical regression model to test the independent variables of CEO 
compensation and CEO duality, to the dependent variable ROE, after controlling for CEO 
age, CEO tenure, and firm size. Researchers use hierarchical regression when they wish 
to enter data into a model in a specific order and to isolate the impact of certain variables 
(Clarke, Crawford, Steele, & Vignoles, 2015). Hadani, Dahan, and Doh (2015) used 
hierarchical regression to control for firm size. Geier (2016) used hierarchical regression 
to isolate the impact of different leadership performance and predict the best model fit.  
Feng and Wang (2016) used hierarchical regression to separate the influence on firm 
performance.  
I explored varying data analysis for this study and settled on a regression analysis 
model. Multiple regression was used to determine the relationship, if any, between data 
sets (Prion & Haerling, 2014; Zhou, Deng, Xia, & Fu, 2016). Multiple regression is used 
by management scholars to examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO 
duality, and ROE. For example, Jung and Subramanian (2017) used a multiple regression 
model to examine the relationship between CEO compensation and competition. Broye et 
al. (2017) used a multiple regression model to examine CEO duality and firm 
performance. In addition, O’Sullivan et al. (2016) studied CEO duality and bank 
performance using a multiple regression model. 
I used a hierarchical multiple regression model to test the relationship between 
CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, 
and firm size. Hierarchical multiple regression is a type of linear regression where 
53 
 
observations fall into hierarchical levels, and the researcher specifies the order that the 
variables are entered (Clarke et al., 2015; Moore, 2014). For this study, I controlled for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. I entered the dependent variable (ROE), followed 
by the control variables (CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size) into SPSS first to ensure 
that I can determine the increase that the control variables have on the variability. After 
this effect was determined, I entered the independent variables (CEO compensation and 
CEO duality) into SPSS to evaluate the predictive power that they have on ROE.  
I considered other data analysis techniques, including standard linear regression 
and stepwise regression, but rejected each of them. Standard linear regression was not 
appropriate because I am controlling for variables (Faul et al., 2009). Stepwise regression 
is not based on theory and involves a large number of explanatory variable and thus was 
not appropriate (Jia, Fang, Tu, & Sun, 2016). Cox regression was also not appropriate, as 
the study did not involve examining time events (Qarahasanlou, Ataei, Khalokakaie, 
Ghodrati, & Jafarei, 2016).  
Assumptions in Statistical Analysis 
The use of multiple regression contains seven key assumptions. These key 
assumptions were (a) outliers, (b) multicollinearity, (c) normality, (d) linearity, (e) 
homoscedasticity, and (f) independence of residuals (Chang, Pal, & Lin, 2017; Zuur & 
Ieno, 2016). Researchers must assess each key assumption to determine the statistical 
corrections to utilize to combat possible violations of the assumptions (Hagan, 2014; 
Zuur & Ieno, 2016).  
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Outliers. Outliers are anomalies in data and outlier observations violate normality 
and may be an indicator of bad data (Leys, Klein, Dominicy, & Ley, 2018; Reza 
Mashinchi, Selamat, Ibrahim, & Fujita, 2016). Outliers can also alter the outcome of 
analysis (Leys et al., 2018). I accessed the existence of outliers by visual inspection of a 
scatter diagram.   
Multicollinearity. Disatnik and Sivan (2016), Winship and Western (2016) and 
Yu, Jiang, and Land (2015) explained that multicollinearity occurs when two predictor 
variables are highly correlated (e.g., > .80). Multicollinearity can lead to unreliable 
results, large standard errors, and a false null hypothesis not being rejected (Yu et al., 
2015). Multicollinearity is detected by examining the bivariate relationship between 
predictor variables (Yu et al., 2015). I addressed the risk of multicollinearity by 
inspecting the bivariate correlations among the independent variables to determine 
whether any large correlations exist.   
Normality. Normality refers to the normal distribution of date (Solomon, 
Howard, & Stein, 2015). Examining plots of standardized residuals is an effective way to 
determine normality (Chang et al., 2017). I examined a P-P plot to validate the normal 
distribution of data. 
Linearity. Linearity refers to the assumption of a continuous baseline trend of 
data (Solomon et al., 2015). Tests of deviations from linearity, including visual tests, are 
used to detect the presence of linearity (Teran Hidalgo, Wu, Engel, & Kosorok, 2018). I 
visually inspected a scatter diagram to assess the linearity of data. 
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Homoscedasticity. Homoscedasticity refers to a clear pattern of distribution of 
data (Solomon et al., 2015). The absence of the homoscedasticity assumption increases 
the possibility of a Type I error and erroneous conclusions (Teran Hidalgo et al., 2018).  I 
used a scatter diagram to look for homoscedasticity.   
Independence of residuals. The absence of a residual pattern is an important 
assumption in multiple regression (Zuur & Ieno, 2016). A nonlinear pattern of residuals 
can invalidate the results of the study (Zuur & Ieno, 2016). I visually inspected a scatter 
diagram to assess the residuals for dependency. 
 I used bootstrapping to address the influence of a violation of assumptions related 
to data distribution. Bootstrapping is a statistical technique that researchers use to 
minimize assumption violations by correcting invalid data or eliminating missing records 
(Chang et al., 2017). Bootstrapping is also used to reduce the possibility of incorrect 
inferences (McNown, Sam, & Goh, 2018). 
Interpreting Results 
 The output from SPSS included numerous statistics that required interpretation.  
The statistics included model predictions including R2, F, and p, and regression analysis 
summary for variables of the unstandardized beta (Β), the standard error for the 
unstandardized beta (SE B), the standardized beta (β), the t-test statistic (t), and the 
probability value (p). Also, reporting of bootstrap B 95% confidence intervals occurred as 
appropriate. 
R2.  R2 is a statistical measure of the strength of the relationship between the 
model and the response variable (Petratos & Damaskou, 2015). R2 is a useful measure 
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because it informs the researcher how close the prediction matches the observed data 
(Rights & Sterba, 2017). If the prediction of the model is perfect, R2 will equal 1 and if 
the model is not perfect R2 will be close to 0. 
 F.  The F ratio of the analysis of variance (i.e., ANOVA) table was used to 
determine whether the null hypotheses should be accepted or rejected by examining the 
significance of the predictor variables (Petratos & Damaskou, 2015). An F ratio of less 
than 0.05 indicates that the measure is significant and the null hypotheses should be 
rejected (Gandhare, Akarte, & Patil, 2018).    
B. The B value is the unstandardized beta and used to determine the validity of the 
model (Petratos & Damaskou, 2015). The B value will be negative or positive. If the 
predictor variable stays constant, the B value predicts by how much in units the 
dependent variable will change (Bernard, Whitson, & Kaufman, 2015).    
 SE B.  The SE B value is the standard error for the unstandardized beta 
(Chivukula, Hariharan, Rana, Thomas, & Andrew, 2017). The SE B value is used to 
display the how far the deviations are from the regression line (Jansson, Nyamathi, 
Heidemann, Duan, & Kaplan, 2015).  
β. The standardized beta β coefficient is used to determine the relationship with 
the dependent variable (Schmidt & Finan, 2018). The standardized beta β coefficient 
indicates how much of the variability of the dependent variable can be explained by a 1-
unit change in the independent variable (Bisceglia & Scigliuto, 2016).  
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 t.  The t-test statistic is calculated for each predictor variable. The t-test is used to 
determine the difference between the mean of the population and the mean of the 
hypothesized sample (Feng, Huang, & Ma, 2017).  
 p. The p statistic is the indicator of the probability that a single variable can 
significantly predict the dependent variable (Schmidt & Finan, 2018). A p-value below 
0.05 is considered significant evidence against the null hypotheses and the null 
hypotheses should be rejected (Ingham-Broomfield, 2016).   
Data Cleaning and Missing Data 
Data cleaning and screening procedures detect errors and inconsistencies in data 
sets and involves looking for coding errors, outliers, and inconsistencies (Zhang, Szabo, 
& Sheng, 2016). To clean, screen and address missing data, I manually examined the 
uniqueness of the records and use descriptive statistics such as mean, mode, median, 
standard deviation, and the maximum value of variables to look for missing data (Tran, 
Havard, & Jorm, 2017). I obtained the raw data for the study from the SEC’s EDGAR 
database. I examined the annual report and proxy statement for each company and 
entered data into a Microsoft Excel® worksheet. From each company’s annual report, I 
obtained the company’s net income after tax from the company’s income statement and 
shareholder equity from the company’s balance sheet for the computation of the 
dependent variable return on equity. I also obtained total assets from the company’s 
balance sheet for the control variable firm size. From each company’s proxy report, I 
obtained the CEO’s age for the CEO age control variable, data on how long the CEO had 
held the CEO position, for the CEO tenure control variable, and data on whether the CEO 
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was also the chairman of the board, for the independent variable CEO duality. From 
Microsoft Excel®, I loaded this data into SPSS.  SPSS is a software program used for 
statistical analysis. SPSS is widely accepted and used to analyze quantitative data 
(Masood & Lodhi, 2016). I used SPSS software version 25 for Windows to analyze data 
generated for this study.  
Study Validity  
In a research setting, study validity means that the inferences reached by the 
researcher address the research questions and draw accurate, meaningful, credible, and 
defensible conclusions (Hagan, 2014; Leedy & Ormrod, 2016; Tavakol & Sandars, 
2014). To establish validity, a researcher collects evidence that supports the interpretation 
of data (Hagan, 2014). The degree to which the instrument or scale measures what it is 
supposed to measure, the more the findings are considered to have validity (Avellar et al., 
2017). Threats to study validity can be internal and external threats (Luft & Shields, 
2014). 
Internal Validity 
This study was a nonexperimental design using correlation to determine whether a 
relationship exists between the independent and dependent variables. I did not attempt to 
establish a causal relationship between variables. Internal validity does not apply to 
nonexperimental research, and thus threats to internal validity were not applicable. 
External Validity 
External validity is the extent to which the findings of the study can be 
generalized to the entire population (Avellar et al., 2017). A more diverse and random 
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sample increases external validity (Avellar et al., 2017; Luft & Shields, 2014; Tavakol & 
Sandars, 2014). The sample for this study was a random sample of publicly traded 
companies listed on the S&P 500 index in 2016. The sample represents a diverse number 
of industries which increases external validity (Luft & Shields, 2014). The source of data 
was the SEC’s EDGAR database, which is a U.S. government website and database that 
contains mandatory company SEC filings (Loughran & McDonald, 2017).  
Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Statistical conclusion validity refers to how accurate the inference is about the 
relationship between the variables and incorrectly applied statistics (Richardson, 
Hudspeth Dalton, Shafer, & Patterson, 2016). Incorrectly applied statistics can result in a 
Type I or Type II error (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). A Type I error is a false-
positive report of results (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). A more diverse sample 
increases external validity but may also increase the threat to statistical conclusion 
validity, including a Type I error. (Luft & Shields, 2014). I addressed the possibility of a 
Type I error by consistently applying the study procedure and visually inspecting data 
patterns for outliers. A Type II error is a false-negative report of results (Bettany-Saltikov 
& Whittaker, 2014). I addressed the possibility of a Type II error by calculating the 
proper sample size prior to initiating the study (Bettany-Saltikov & Whittaker, 2014). 
Statistical conclusion validity also includes conditions relating to the reliability of the 
instrument, data assumptions, and the sample size (Richardson et al., 2016). 
Reliability of instrument. Instruments are used to collect data relevant to a 
research question (Birley & Moreland, 2014; Hagan, 2014). Due to the use of archival 
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data, the use of a psychometrically sound data collection instrument was not required. I 
used Microsoft Excel® to collect, filter, and process the raw data. Archival sources are a 
valid research collection technique (Davis-Kean et al., 2015).  
Data assumptions. Data assumptions could be a threat to the validity of the 
statistical conclusions (Hagan, 2014; Solomon et al., 2015). The key assumptions of 
multiple regression are sample size, outliers, normality, multicollinearity, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals (Chang et al., 2017). Bootstrapping, 
using 1,000 samples, was employed to combat the influence of possible assumption 
violations.  
Sample size. Too small of a sample size may lead to invalid statistical 
conclusions (Solomon et al., 2015; Winship & Western, 2016). The threat can be 
addressed by an adequate sample size (Winship & Western, 2016). To determine the 
appropriate sample size, I conducted a power analysis to achieve a minimum power of 
.80. The results of the power analysis indicate a minimum sample of 68 records was 
required to achieve a minimum power of .80. Therefore, I collected at least 68 data 
records to ensure the sample size was not a threat to statistical conclusion validity. The 
use of this sample, however, may not represent the entire S&P 500 index which was a 
threat to validity (Avellar et al., 2017). Thus, the limitation of the sample size limits any 
findings of the study. 
Researchers need to identify outliers in data that could lead to non-normality.    
Multicollinearity may exist where there is a large standard deviation and possible linear 
dependencies among independent variables (Winship & Western, 2016). I addressed 
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multicollinearity by using an inter-correlation matrix to determine whether any large 
correlations exist. To reduce the possibility of the violation of assumptions, I used robust 
estimates of confidence level and standard errors, bootstrapping, and hierarchical linear 
regression to isolate the control variables. 
Transition and Summary 
In Section 2, I started with a reiteration of the purpose of the study, which was to 
examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after 
controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, followed by a discussion of the 
methodology and design. In this section, I also identified the population as data records of 
companies listed on the S&P 500 index in 2016 and random sample calculated as 68 of 
these companies. I entered collected data into Microsoft Excel® and the source of data 
were the SEC’s EDGAR database. I analyzed data using a hierarchical regression model. 
Finally, this section included a discussion of the validity of the study focusing on the 
SEC’s EDGAR database. Section 3, the final section of this study, consists of the 
findings of the study, the implications for social change, and recommendations for action 






Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The independent variables were CEO compensation 
and CEO duality. The dependent variable was ROE. The control variables were CEO age, 
CEO tenure, and firm size. Based on the results of the statistical analysis, I accepted 
H01and H02 that there was not a statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
firm size. I rejected the alternative hypotheses; a statistically significant relationship 
exists between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, 
CEO tenure, and firm size, which was based on a sample size with moderate 
generalizability to the population. 
Presentation of the Findings 
 In this section, I discuss the findings of the study, including the tests of 
assumptions, descriptive statistics, inferential results, and analysis summary. I conclude 
with a theoretical conversation pertaining to the findings of the study. I examined the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size using hierarchical multiple linear regression. The 
initial sample was 68 companies on the S&P 500 Index. I removed 21 outliers and the 
final sample was 47 companies. The confidence interval was 95% and the significance 
level was 5%.   
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Tests of Assumptions 
A primary goal of the researcher is high-quality data (Corrales, Corrales, & 
Ledezma, 2018). Before data analysis, I performed a preliminary analysis of the sample.  
Data preparation and cleaning are a necessary step to ensure the quality of the study 
(Corrales et al., 2018). My first step in the preliminary analysis was to review histograms 
of the variables.   
Outliers. Outliers are anomalies in data and can alter the outcome of analysis 
(Leys et al., 2018; Reza Mashinchi et al., 2016). Once outliers are detected, the researcher 
must inspect them (Leys et al., 2018). To examine the outliers, I visually inspected 
boxplots for each variable. A review of the histogram for the dependent variable ROE 
displayed a skew to the left with several outliers on both sides of the mean. 
 




For the independent variable CEO compensation, I identified one outlier. The 
mean CEO compensation for the sample was $14.3 million, and the median was $11.84 
million. The outlier was a CEO with compensation of approximately $70 million. No 
other outlier was noted for this company, and the board structure for this company did not 
include CEO duality. Figure 3 exhibits the outlier in CEO compensation.   
 
Figure 3. Boxplot displaying outlier in independent variable CEO compensation. 
   For the dependent variable, ROE, I identified eight outliers. Three of the outliers 
were above the mean ROE of 12.1%, and five were below the mean. Further 
investigation of these outliers indicated that of the five companies below the lower 
quartile, three had a negative shareholders equity and two had a net loss rather than a net 
income which produced a negative ROE. Of the five companies below the lower quartile, 
one company had both a CEO tenure and CEO age outlier, and another had a CEO tenure 
outlier. Four of these companies had a board structure of CEO duality. Of the three 
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company outliers in the upper quartile, one had a CEO age outlier, and all three had a 
board structure that included CEO duality. Figure 4 indicates the outliers for the control 
variable ROE. 
 
Figure 4. Boxplot displaying outliers in the dependent variable ROE. 
For the control variable CEO age, I identified three outliers. Each of these CEOs 
was at least 75 years old. The mean CEO age was 53.8 years. Each company with a CEO 
outlier had another outlier. One company had both CEO tenure and ROE outliers, one 
company also had a CEO tenure outlier, and one company also had an ROE outlier above 
the upper quartile. Each of the companies with CEO age outliers had a board structure 





Figure 5. Boxplot displaying outlier for control variable CEO age. 
For the control variable tenure, I identified four outliers. Each of these outliers 
had a tenure of more than 25 years, while the mean CEO tenure for the sample was 7.71 
years. Two of the companies had two additional outliers, and each of these had a board 
structure that included CEO duality. One had a CEO age and ROE outlier, and another 
had a CEO age and firm size outlier. The other two companies with CEO tenure outliers 
had one additional outlier. One company had an ROE outlier and did not have a board 
structure that includes CEO duality, and the other company had a firm size outlier and a 




Figure 6. Boxplot displaying outlier for control variable CEO tenure. 
For the control variable firm size, I identified 13 outliers. Nine of the 13 outliers 
had a board structure that included CEO duality. The mean firm size was $85 million, 
and each of the 13 outlier companies had total assets greater than $117 million. Two of 
these companies also had CEO tenure outliers, and one of those had both a CEO tenure 




Figure 7. Boxplot displaying outlier in control variable firm size. 
Based on the visual inspection of data for the sample of 68, I identified 29 outliers 
in 21 companies. Of the 21 companies with outliers, 15 had one outlier, four had two 
outliers, and two of the companies had three outliers. In the sample of 68, 42 companies 
had a board structure with CEO duality, and 16 of those 42 were companies with outliers.  
My inspection of the data indicated that the outliers led to a structural break in the data.  
A structural break exists when outliers change the mean or trend of the data (Greenwood-
Nimmo & Shields, 2017). Outliers can severely distort the estimation of the population 
and inflate Type I errors (Auer, Reiner, & Leal, 2016; Leys et al., 2018). Outliers can also 
alter the outcome of analysis (Leys et al., 2018). Based on this analysis, I removed 21 
outliers from the study and performed a preliminary analysis of the 47 remaining 
companies. I assessed the existence of outliers in the remaining 47 companies by a visual 
inspection of the histogram for each variable (see Figure 8 for an example of the 




Figure 8. Histogram of the dependent variable of ROE for hypothesis one. 
Figures 8 displays the data distribution for the dependent variable ROE which 
appears normally distributed for the sample of 47. I used bootstrapping to address the 
influence of a violation of assumptions related to data distribution. Bootstrapping is a 
statistical technique that researchers use to minimize assumption violations by correcting 
invalid data or eliminating missing records (Chang et al., 2017). Based on the use of 
bootstrapping and the normal distribution of the sample of 47, I proceeded to test the key 
assumptions of (a) outliers, (b) multicollinearity, (c) normality, (d) linearity, (e) 
homoscedasticity, and (f) independence of residuals.  
Outliers. In the sample of 47, no outliers existed for the independent variables 
CEO compensation and CEO duality, or the dependent variable ROE. Two of the three 
control variables, CEO tenure and firm size had outliers. CEO tenure had 4 outliers 
(Figure 9) and firm size had one outlier (Figure 10). The control variable, CEO age, did 
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not have any outliers in the sample of 47. No company had more than one outlier. 
Bootstrapping using 1,000 samples enabled me to minimize the influence of violations of 
assumptions. Further analysis of the outliers indicated the outliers did not have an impact 
on the results of the study.   
 





Figure 10. Boxplot displaying outlier in control variable firm size. 
Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when two independent variables are 
highly or auto-correlated (Disatnik & Sivan, 2016; Winship & Western, 2016; Yu et al., 
2015). Auto-correlated predictor variables in a regression model could introduce large 
standard errors that impact the power of the test (Winship & Western, 2016). I addressed 
the risk of multicollinearity by inspecting the bivariate correlations among the 
independent variables to determine whether any large correlations exist. Researchers 
suggest that the Pearson correlation between the independent variables equal to or greater 
than .7 indicates that multicollinearity may exist (Yu et al., 2015). Table 3 presents the 
correlational coefficients and shows the highest correlation as .496 confirming that 

















CEO Compensation 1.00 .221 .161 .109 .070 .391 
CEO Duality .221 1.00 .177 .322 .343 .147 
ROE .161 .177 1.00 -.065 -.002 -.148 
CEO Tenure .109 .322 -.065 1.00 .496 -.108 
CEO Age .070 .343 -.002 .496 1.00 -.113 
Firm Size .391 .147 -.148 -.108 -.113 1.00 
Note. N=47 
Normality, Linearity, Homoscedasticity, and Independence of residuals. To 
assess the assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of 
residuals, I examined the normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression standardized 
residual (see Figures 11 and 12) and the scatterplot of the standardized residual (see 
Figures 13 and 14).   
 






Figure 12. Normal probability plot (P-P) of regression standardized residuals for 
hypothesis two. 
Researchers assess normality by examining a P-P plot (Chang et al., 2017). Figures 
11 and 12 display clustered residuals around the linear distribution lines. Clustering 
indicates a normal distribution of data and no violation of the normality assumption 
(Chang et al., 2017). Residuals represent the different between actual and predicted values 
and should also be normally distributed (Chang et al., 2017).   Figures 13 and 14 display 




Figure 13. Scatterplot of the standardized residuals for hypothesis one. 
 
 
Figure 14. Scatterplot of the standardized residuals for hypothesis two. 
A visual inspection of a scatterplot can be used to test the assumptions of 
linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals (Teran Hidalgo et al., 2018).   
I examined Figures 13 and 14 to test these assumptions. The examination indicated that 





 Descriptive statistics are used to provide summarized data in tables, figures, 
charts, or graphs (Rendón-Macías, Villasís-Keever, & Miranda-Novales, 2016). The 
population included the 500 companies listed on the S&P 500 Index in 2016. I selected 
68 for the initial sample and eliminated 21 outliers’ records, resulting in 47 records for 
the study analysis. Descriptive statistics of the variables appear in Table 4. 
Table 4 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Quantitative Study Variables 
Variable M SD Bootstrapped 95% CI (M) N 
CEO Compensation 12.45 5.42 [10.82,13.75] 47 
ROE 16.2 16.4 [0.12, 0.20] 47 
CEO Tenure 5.68 5.81 [3.98, 7.12] 47 
CEO Age 57.15 4.81 [55.86, 58.43] 47 
Firm Size 77.6 15.1 [21.26, 46.53] 47 
 
Inferential Results 
 Hierarchical linear regression, α = .05 (two-tailed), was used to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The independent variables were CEO compensation 
and CEO duality. The dependent variable was ROE. The control variables were CEO age, 
COE tenure, and firm size. The null hypotheses was that CEO compensation and CEO 
duality would not significantly predict ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, 
and firm size. The alternative hypotheses was that CEO compensation and CEO duality 
would not significantly predict ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm 
size. An analysis was conducted to assess the assumptions of outliers, multicollinearity, 
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normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals. I eliminated 21 
outliers from the study and noted no serious violations of multicollinearity, normality, 
linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals. 
CEO Compensation. Null and alternative hypothesis one were as follows: 
H01: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha1: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation 
and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
The control variables CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size were entered at step 
one, explaining 2.9% of the variance in the dependent variable ROE. As shown in Table 
6, the relationship between the control variables and ROE was not significant (t =.472, p 
> .05). In Step two, I entered the independent variable, CEO compensation. The R2=0.093 
value indicated that the independent variable accounted for 9.3% of the variation in ROE. 
The inclusion of CEO compensation in the second step accounted for an additional 6.4% 
of the variance in return on equity but was also not significant (t = 1.724, p > .05). Taken 






Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Independent Variables for Hypothesis 
One 
Variable B SE B ß T p  B 95% Bootstrap CI  
Step 1       
 CEO Tenure -0.003 0.005 -0.096 -0.555 0.582 [-.011, .006] 
 CEO Age 0.001 0.006 0.029 0.165 0.87 [-.009, .013] 
 Firm Size 0 0 -0.155 -1.021 0.313 [.000, .000] 
Step 2       
 CEO Tenure -0.004 0.005 -0.132 -0.771 0.445 [-.012, 005] 
 CEO Age 0 0.006 0.014 0.081 0.936 [-.009, .014] 
 Firm Size 0 0 -0.269 -1.659 0.105 [.000, .000] 
  CEO Compensation 0.008 0.005 0.279 1.724 0.092 [-.022, .137] 
Note. N=47 
Note. Step 1: F (3, 47) = 0.43, p = .733. R2 = .029. 
 
Note. Step 2: F (4, 46) = 1.08, p = .379. R2 = .093. Δ R2 = .064 (p = .092). 
 
CEO Duality. Null and alternative hypothesis two were as follows: 
H02: There is not a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
Ha2: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO duality and 
ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. 
The control variables CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size were entered at step 
one, explaining 2.9% of the variance in the dependent variable ROE. As shown in Table 
6, the relationship between the control variables and ROE was not significant (t =.472, p 
> .05). In Step two, I entered the independent variable, CEO duality and the R2=0.089 
value indicated that the independent variable accounted for 8.9% of the variation in ROE. 
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The inclusion of CEO duality in the second step accounted for an additional 6.0% of the 
variance in return on equity but was not significant (t = 1.666, p > .05). Taken together, 
these findings provided no support to reject null hypothesis two. 
Table 6 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Independent Variables for Hypothesis 
Two 
Variable B SE B ß T p  B 95% Bootstrap CI  
Step 1       
 CEO Tenure -0.003 0.005 -0.096 -0.555 0.582 [-.011, .006] 
 CEO Age 0.001 0.006 0.029 0.165 0.87 [-.009, .013] 
 Firm Size 0 0 -0.155 -1.021 0.313 [.000, .000] 
Step 2       
 CEO Tenure -0.004 0.005 -0.155 -0.893 0.377 [-.012, .005] 
 CEO Age -0.001 0.006 -0.042 -0.239 0.813 [-.011, .012] 
 Firm Size 0 0 -0.209 -1.376 0.176 [.000, .000] 
  CEO Duality 0.089 0.053 0.272 1.666 0.103 [-.024, .167] 
Note. N=47 
Note. Step 1: F (3, 47) = 0.43, p = .733. R2 = .029. 
Note. Step 2: F (4, 46) = 1.03, p = .403. R2 = .089. Δ R2 = .060 (p = .103) 
Analysis Summary 
The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
firm size. I used a hierarchical regression model to test the independent variables of CEO 
compensation and CEO duality, to the dependent variable ROE, after controlling for CEO 
age, CEO tenure, and firm size. I assessed the assumptions surrounding multiple 
regression which indicated outliers. I removed outliers from the study, and no serious 
violations were noted thereafter in the assumptions. Hypothesis one (CEO compensation 
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as the independent variable and ROE as the dependent variable after controlling for 
tenure, age, and firm size) was supported (Table 5). Hypothesis two (CEO duality as the 
independent variable and ROE as the dependent variable with ROE after controlling for 
tenure, age, and firm size) was also supported (Table 6). 
Theoretical Conversation on Findings 
The findings of this study were that CEO compensation and CEO duality do not 
have a statistically significant relationship to ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO 
tenure, and firm size. The findings contradict the supposition of agency theory and 
support agency theory critics. The outliers in CEO tenure may indicate that researchers 
should consider viewing CEO compensation and CEO duality through an alternate 
theory, such as stakeholder or stewardship theory. The findings of this study may suggest 
that as corporate organizational structure has become more complex, agency theory is not 
as applicable to the business environment as it used to be (Bendickson et al., 2016). Sikka 
and Stittle (2017) supported this view, asserting that given a globalized economy and 
resulting dispersion of shareholders, control of the corporation by these shareholders is 
not possible, and a different model of corporate governance is necessary. Pouryousefi and 
Frooman (2017) suggest that the bounds of agency theory could be viewed through a 
bilateral cautionary-tale view where each party is both the principal and the agent. 
Contributing to the mixed findings regarding the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance, the findings of this study were consistent with the 
findings of Gupta and Sharma (2014), but inconsistent with the findings of Chen and 
Jermias (2014) and Jaggia and Thosar (2017) who found a positive correlation between 
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CEO compensation and firm performance. Chen and Jermias (2014) noted that their 
findings may not apply to all firms in all circumstances and the study performed by 
Jaggia and Thosar (2017) studied companies in the finance industry before and after a 
financial crisis which could have impacted their results. Jaggia and Thosar (2017) note, 
however, that the positive correlation was stronger in larger companies.  
The results of the study also contributed to the mixed findings regarding the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. The findings of this study were 
consistent with the findings of Collum et al. (2014), but inconsistent with the findings of 
Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana (2015) who found that CEO duality increases firm 
performance and Jermias and Gani (2014) who found that CEO duality negatively affects 
firm performance. Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-Santana (2015) note, however, that leaders 
of family-owned firms may exhibit more stewardship theory characteristics because the 
welfare of the family is at stake. 
Application to Professional Practice 
The results of the study may be of value to business leaders and members of the 
boards of directors of companies. Poor decisions and conflicts of interest by members of 
company boards of directors have been a factor in the dramatic rise in CEO 
compensation, resulting in a lower ROE for investors (Hill et al., 2016). Understanding 
that there may not be a relationship between CEO compensation and ROE could save 
company shareholders money and better align the interests of the CEO with the 
shareholders to reduce shareholder conflict. Provisions of the DFA require that 
shareholders vote on executive compensation plans and business leaders disclose their 
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rationale for CEO duality or not (Cebon & Hermalin, 2015; Zalewska, 2014). The finding 
that CEO duality does not have a statistically significant impact on ROE displays that one 
person sharing the position of CEO and Chairman of the Board and CEO may be an 
optimal board structure for a firm.   
Implications for Social Change 
The results of this study may contribute to positive social change by building 
confidence in capital markets which contributes to economic growth (Chapman et al., 
2017; Das & Das, 2016). Economic growth leads to increased employment levels, foreign 
direct investment, and increased economic opportunity for people living in developing 
parts of the world and their communities because of direct investment by companies in 
the United States (Rafindadi & Yusof, 2015). Additionally, as provisions of the DFA, 
such as the requirement to disclose the pay ratio of the CEO to the average worker, are 
released by more business leaders, company stakeholders might also acquire an 
understanding of disparities in compensation. This understanding could lead to better 
alignment of societal, stakeholder, and shareholder goals and lead to social change.   
Recommendations for Action 
The results of this study indicate that there was not a statistically significant 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. While the result was consistent with the results 
achieved by other scholars, one CEO compensation level or board structure may not fit 
all companies at all levels of maturity (Palanissamy, 2015). Business leaders and 
compensation committees should review the research for guidance in determining 
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whether the compensation level for the CEO is appropriate for the particular CEO based 
on experience, individual characteristics, as well as the characteristics of the particular 
company. Company shareholders could pay attention to the results of this study and other 
studies to determine the optimal structure of the board of directors based on the 
composition, individual characteristics, and experience of the CEO and board of 
directors.    
Scholars could use this study as a starting point to examine more specific 
characteristics of CEO compensation and CEO duality both in the U.S. and 
internationally. I intend to publish the final version of this study in the ProQuest 
dissertations database and submit a refined version to finance and accounting research-
based publications. I also plan to present the findings of this study at professional finance 
and accounting conferences or workshops.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
The results of this study indicated no statistically significant relationship between 
CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, 
and firm size.  The limitations of this study provide areas for further research, as the 
population of publicly traded companies on the S&P 500, focusing on data from 2016, 
and the focus on one measure of company performance, ROE. As my study included data 
from publicly traded companies in the United States from a broad spectrum of industries, 
I would recommend a sample from a single industry. A single industry may have specific 
characteristics that impact CEO compensation and CEO duality and may be more 
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generalizable to the general population. In a similar study to mine, Chen and Jermias 
(2014) noted their results may not apply to all firms in all circumstances.  
My second limitation was that I focused on data from 2016. As compliance with 
the DFA matures, more data on its impact will become available and an extended period 
may be obtained and studied. I also recommend that the impact of government 
regulations, such as the DFA in the United States, as well as government regulation 
internationally, be a focus of future comparative research. I used ROE as the measure of 
corporate financial performance and found outliers existed on both the positive and 
negative side of ROE. I recommend that studies focus on different measures of financial 
performance such as ROA, Tobin’s Q, and earnings per share. 
The outliers in this study offer significant areas for further research, especially the 
outliers that were present in more than one variable. One of the sample companies had 
outliers in ROE, CEO age, and CEO tenure. CEO tenure is a factor that needs to receive 
consideration when company leaders determine compensation (Zona, 2016). Further 
research into this company indicated that the CEO was also the founder of the company. I 
recommend that additional research surrounding CEO compensation and CEO duality be 
viewed through the lens of stewardship theory as stewardship is inherent in family 
businesses because the welfare of the entire family is at stake (Cabrera-Suárez & Martín-
Santana, 2015).   
Additional research regarding the outliers and the characteristics of a company 
that impact firm value could enable boards of directors’ members to determine the CEO 
compensation level and board structure that may optimize value for shareholders. Several 
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of the companies excluded from the study had been in business greater than 25 years 
which could indicate that the age and lifecycle stage of the company may be a factor in 
CEO compensation and board structure. Finally, the most significant number of outliers 
occurred in the control variable firm size. Researchers should investigate whether the size 
of a firm has an impact on CEO compensation and CEO duality as it related to firm 
performance. Information from future studies might help business leaders and boards of 
directors understand CEO compensation, and board of directors’ structure as their 
companies grow and mature. 
Reflections 
I found the DBA Doctoral Study process at Walden University to be challenging 
and interesting. I expected to see a relationship between CEO compensation and ROE 
and CEO duality and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size 
based on my preconceived notions of the topic. I did not expect to find the number of 
outliers in the data. I also expected more explaining power from the predictive variables, 
and I am intrigued by several avenues for future research. 
I benefited the most from conducting the research process, which required time 
management and patience during draft iterations. These are skills that I will take with me 
for the rest of my life and career. Finally, I do not think I will ever look at another 
research study the same way again. My paradigm has shifted and I feel that I am looking 
at research, especially on the news, more critically and in more depth using the skills that 




The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The independent variables were CEO compensation 
and CEO duality. The dependent variable was ROE and CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm 
size were the control variables. The target population for this study included all 
companies listed on the S&P 500 index in 2016. Using multiple regression, the results of 
the study indicated that there was not a statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and 
firm size.   
The results of this study may contribute to social change by building confidence 
in capital markets which may spur economic growth and increase employment levels 
around the world (Chapman et al., 2017; Das & Das, 2016; Rafindadi & Yusof, 2015). 
Business leaders may embrace the findings of this study to help determine the optimal 
CEO compensation level and the board of directors’ structure for business to optimize 
profits for shareholders. Knowing the optimal level of CEO compensation and board 
structure could reduce shareholders conflict.   
Researchers who focused on examining the relationship between CEO 
compensation, CEO duality, and ROE have generated mixed results (Cabrera-Suárez & 
Martín-Santana, 2015; Zona, 2016). Agency theorists argue that the alignment of the 
CEO compensation is imperative to maximize firm performance (Chen & Jermias, 2014).  
Agency theorists also argue that a board structure where the CEO is also the chairman of 
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the board is a conflict of interest (Amzaleg et al., 2014). Based on the results of my study, 
a relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for 
CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size was not found. Additional research should be 
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